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CIVIL AVIATION--THE RELATIVE SCOPE OF JURIS-
DICTION OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
By MRS. ROYAL B. BINZER*
INTRODUCTION
The law of aviation, while becoming highly specialized, is
closely related to other fields of law. Laws govern human con-
duct. Flying is one of man's most complex activities, and the
conduct he displays therein affects his other activities, civil,
military, municipal, federal, international-all various fields of
law.
This paper is a study of the jurisdictional spheres of the
several states and the Federal government. Today the trend
seems to be toward greater, almost exclusive power of the Fed-
eral government, but in order to understand this trend one must
go back to the early days of aviation and follow through the
legislative development.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AERONAUTICS
In modern times, many pioneer experimenters have en-
deavored to develop powered flight. One of the earliest, Sir
George Gayley (1809-10), wrote of his plans to develop dy-
namic flight on a scientific basis. By the end of the 19th cen-
tury, there were two distinct schools of thought-the exponents
of gliding flight, including Otto Lilienthal, Octave Shanute and
J. J. Montgomery, and the second school, which sought to de-
velop powered flight. This group was led by Clement Ader,
Sir Hiram Stevens Maxim and Samuel Pierpont Langley. Cle-
ment Ader was the first to construct an airplane that would
carry a man, but when experiments failed, the French govern-
ment withdrew its support.
The Wright brothers, Orville and Wilbur, after studying
all the then known theories of flight, finally achieved the first
powered flight of a heavier-than-air machine on December 17,
1903.
During World War I, knowledge of aeronautics was con-
fined to the military types of planes. This brought about the
* University of Toledo Law School.
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dt-velopment of armored bodies (prior to that time planes were
of wood construction), but it was not until Fokker exhibited
his welded steel fuselage in 1922 that metal construction came
to the fore in America. The use of metal has fostered the rapid
rowth of aviation because of its safety and durability.'
After the war, the fii'st aerial passenger lines began to be
established on several routes, and in 1917 aerial mail service was
inaug'urated. The Atlantic was crossed in a non-stop flight in
1919. and in 1923 American Army officers made the first non-
s,,top coast to coast flight from MNineola, Long Island, to San
Diego. California. In 1924, American Army officers flew
around the world. In 1927, Charles Lindbergh flew a non-stop
solo flight from New York to Paris and the world recognized
that aviation had become an established fact.
Comparative figures of speed and distance show an inter-
esting picture: the Wright's long distance record was 77.5
miles; in 1933 Codor and Rosie flew non-stop from New York
to Rayak, Syria, a distance of 5,653 miles; Wright's maximum
speed was 30 m.p.h.; today's maximum speed of military planes
is, (of ,-ourse, a military secret, but in 1934 a sea plane estab-
lished a record of 440 m.p.h., and a few days ago, two planes
flew from coast to coast in approximately six hours. Commer-
vial air lines have already set up schedules and rates for week-
end trips to spots all over the world for our post war vacations,
aid it must be kept in mind that this has all been developed in a
space of 25 years. For while it is 40 years since the Wrights
first flew at Kitty Hawk, it is only 25 years, and since the end
,f World War I that commercial flying and air mail service
routes started.
IlIISTORICAL BACKGROUND op LEGISLATION
In 1911, when flying was truly in its infancy, the Commit-
tee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the American Bar
Association was offered a resolution by Judge Simeon E. Bald-
win, which contained the following points: (1) that no one
ought to be allowed to fly without having passed an examination
given by some public authority, nor without having filed some
Today with the development of plywood construction, wooden
fuselages are becoming more practical and widely used even in mili-
tary planes, such as the "Mosquitoes."
- American Bar Assn. Report, 380 et seq.; see also Baldwin, Lia-
bility in Aerial Navigation (1910) 9 MicH. L. R. 20.
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bond to answer for any damage he might inflict; (2) that each
state should regulate this testing and bonding by statute in re-
spect to intrastate traffic and as respecting police regulation of
all flights over its territory; (3) that Congress, under its .oin-
merce powers, should regulate interstate and foreignu air
traffic.
The Committee refused to recommend adoption of the reso-
lution on the basis that the policy of the Association "is not to
propose legislation unless it is on a subject of general interest"
and therefore necessary. Commerce by air, at that time, had
not grown sufficiently to be of general interest.
Judge Baldwin, as Governor of Connecticut, persuaded his
legislature to pass an air navigation bill in 1911. This was the
first regulation of aviation in America.3 In 1913, Massachusetts
enacted an aviation law,4 and in 19195 passed a new law, estab-
lishing a commission to regulate the actual flying.
In 1913 Senator Penrose and Congressman Vare introduced
companion bills for regulation of all flight everywhere by the
Federal government. These were not passed.
The increasing tendency toward piecemeal state legislation
grew apace in 1917-1919. Several states passed such statutes,
among them being California, New York, Texas, Washington
and Wisconsin.
In September, 1919, the Conference of Bar Association
Delegates 7 adopted a resolution on motion of Mr. William V.
Rooker which stated that "aeronautics should properly lie
within the admiralty jurisdiction, that a committee representing
each state be appointed to make further inquiry into the ques-
tion; . . . that the proper communication be made to the ('on-
gress of the United States and appropriate legislation extending
remedies to the aggrieved at common law may be enacted."
The Committee was appointed and submitted two reports,
January 5, 1920, and July 1, 1920, in which Federal legislation
upon aviation under the admiralty power was strongly urged.
Hydroplanes had been classed as "vessels" by the Department
'Gen. Statutes 1919, Chapter 176, Secs. 3107-3117.
'L. 1913, Chapter 663.
Gen. Acts 1919, Chapter 306.
'S. 1295 and H. R. 3916.
'6 American Bar Assn. Journal 42, January, 1920.
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,f Commerce ' and so subjected to Federal water navigation
laws.
During all this time there had been an unofficial regulation
of aviation by the Aero Club of America which had examined
and licensed a large number of balloonists and aviators.
An act of Congress, approved March 3, 1915, had estab-
lished a National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, with
twelve members, representatives of the Army, Navy and scien-
tific men, but there was no member especially qualified to pass
upon legal questions. This committee had given several annual
reports.'
During World War I, a presidential proclamation forbade
flying in the war zone of the United States without a license
from the joint Army and Navy Board.1 0 The whole of the
United States, its territorial waters, insular possessions and the
Panama Canal Zone were designated as the zone of military
operations."
A Federal bill was introduced by the government authori-
ties in 1919,"' prohibiting civil interstate or international flying
without a license from the Secretary of Commerce. The bill
was not pressed due to the desire to await the report of the
International Aeronautic Commission, then sitting in Paris.
Since that date a number of unsuccessful bills have been
introduced in Congress, including one by M2r. Cordell Hull,
which provided for the Department of Aeronautics. 13 These
bills all attacked the problem from different angles and views.
On May 20, 1926, the Air Commerce Act was passed. This
was the first Federal legislation on aeronautics. Several
amendments and corrections were added from time to time, and
Opinion of Solicitor for Department of Commerce, February 17,
1914.
'The report for 1921 urged Federal legislation: " . . . is of the
opinion that state legislation should follow and be in accordance with
national legislation on the subject of air navigation and for this
reason believes it would be wise for the various states to withhold
independent action, pending the enactment of Federal legislation on
the subject." No action developed from this. Law Memoranda on
Civil Aeronautics, Legislative History of Air Commerce Act, pp.
81-82.
"'WooDHOUSE, TEXTBOOK OF AERIAL LAWS (1920) p. 141.
"Today the restrictions are contrastingly lighter; civilian flying
has continued except in coastal areas and over certain designated
military areas.
'WOODHOUSE, TEXTBOOK OF AERIAL LAWS (1920) p. 89.
"January 29, 1920, H.R. 12134; Winslow Bill 1925, H.R. 13715.
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in 1938 the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed enlarging the
Federal powers. There is now pending the Lea Bill, which is
causing considerable debate because of its still greater enlarge-
ment of Federal power.
PROBLEMIS TO BE SOLVED
In determining the form which the laws regulating aerial
navigation should take, several fundamental problems must be
solved. There are two underlying problems: (1) Can there be
private property rights in the air? and (2) Who has sovereignty
of the air? Then the constitutional problems: (1) The basis of
the Federal power; (2) The extent of the Federal power; and
(3) The extent of the state power.
PRIVATE PROPERTY IN AIR SPACE
The property of the individual and the sovereignty of the
state are two distinct concepts. 14
The three essential attributes of property are: (1) The
right to use and control; (2) The right to enjoy and receive the
income; and (3) The right to alienate and dispose. 15 These
attributes result from the ability of man to take physical pos-
session of land. The earth has that characteristic, while air,
from its nature, is not readily appropriated.
Does the landowner own the space above his land in the
same sense that he owns the soil? That is, is he entitled to ex-
clusive possession of such space; is he entitled to exclude others
even though he would suffer no damage from their use of it?
This view of space ownership derives from the common law
maxim1 "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad eoelum," derived
from the Roman law and which is also found in the Code
Napoleon, Sec. 552, but a qualification of it has been accepted in
most continental and Latin American countries. "The righlt of
the owner of a piece of land extends to the space above the sur-
face and to the earth under the surface. Howsoever the owner
cannot prohibit interferences which take place at such height
or depth that he has no interest in their exclusion." (That is,
beyond the bounds in which the owner has effective possession
or use.)
'1 WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS, p. 131.
"FxEL, LAW OF AVIATION (1927) p. 68.
11 COKE ON LITTLETON, Sec. 4a: "he who owns the earth owns
to the heavens."
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It is believed that "an examination of the cases will show
that 'cujus est solum' is not law, but i., merely a nice theory,
easily passed down from medieval days, because, until recently,
there was no occasion to apply it to its full extent. 17 Despite
the persistence of "cujus est solum," its application to the space
not immediately adjacent to the soil is wanting. All the de-
,,isions are regarding intrusions into the space near the surface,
where the actual use of the soil by the surface occupant was
disturbed."'
It thus appears that the only rights in space which have
actually been protected by the courts have been rights in space
immediately adjacent to and connected with the surface. There
are no decisions to the effect that it is a wrong against a land-
owner to interfere with the space over his land at such a
height that the use of the surface is not affected in the slightest
degree. 1'
Leading text writers agree in substance that, in the words
of Pollock, "the scope of possible trespasses is limited by that
of possible effective possession." Mfany of them have agreed
that a "natural easement" or right of passage should be
g'ranted to aircraft and that flight over land at such a height as
not to interfere with the use to which the land is actually put
should not of itself constitute a trespass.
These questions go to the essence of aviation law. If the
air space is owned absolutely by the surface owner, then all
Law Memoranda on Civil Aeronautics, Legislative History of
Air Commerce Act (1926) p. 36.
'In Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N.Y. 486 (1906), it
was held that ejectment would lie for the space occupied by a tele-
phone wire strung across plaintiff's land at a height of 20 or 30 feet.
In a French case (1912) aviators were held liable for flying at
low heights over land, whereby animals and workmen were fright-
ened. This was held to be an interference with the use of the surface,
although there was no contact. Law Memoranda on Civil Aero-
nautics, p. 89.
In the case of Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns 381, 10 Am. Dec. 234
(1822), Guille ascended in a balloon and descended into Swan's
garden, dragging over 30 feet into the vegetable plot. Over 200
people broke into the premises, ruining the gardens. The court held
that, while the ascension per se, is not an unlawful act, if the descent
would ordinarily draw a crowd of people from curiosity or to rescue
him from a dangerous situation, he must be held responsible for the
damage done.
"'PoLLOcc, TORTS (3rd ed.) 364; SALMOND, TORTS 163; CHAPIN,
TORTS 349; Baldwin, Airship Law (1910) 4 Am. J. INT. LAW 95;
HAZELTINE, LAW OF Am, Chap. 2, 194; Zollman, Government Con-
trol of Aircraft (1919) 53 Am. L. R. 711.
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flight is a trespass and a constitutional amendment might be
necessary, by which the people would give up their property
rights in air space and allow an easement of passage.2-'" Such
an amendment was proposed.
Another means to accomplish the same end would be the
use of the right of eminent domain, by which the state could
declare that such airways Were essential for the good of the gen-
eral public. This method could be carried out on the analogy
that airplanes are means of travel owned by private companies
but serving the public. Even if the difficulty of condemning an
casement through unmarkable air could be overcome, the
analogy breaks down on the issue of the private flyers. The
right of the private flyer to use of air space would still have to
be established, or he would be constantly liable for trespass.
This would be an unsatisfactory, incomplete solution.
To retain the doctrine "usque ad coelum" in its entirety
would be fatal to civil aviation; but to allow unrestricted flying
over private property at all altitudes would interfere with the
reasonable rights of landowners, either as a trespass or a
nuisance. Therefore the Committee (formulating the Civil
Aeronautics Bill, 1926) recommended that the action for tres-
pass would lie only for material damage done, and an action for
nuisance should lie for damages oily, and then only if a breach
of flying regulations is proved. This doctrine is now accepted;
the individual property owner is not the absolute owner of his
superadjacent air space. This has been affirmed by both Fed-
eral statute and International agreement. "1
Major Johnson, in brief to Director of U. S. Air Service, p. 29.
Fed. Air Act, sec. 3.
In the Swetland case, Swetland et al. v. Curtiss Airports Corp.,
55 F. (2d) 201 (C.C.A. 6, 1932), it was held that the act of aircraft
passing over plaintiff's land at low altitude is a trespass, but the
court refused the permanent injunction prayed for; "apart from the
matter of state sovereignty in air space, a landowner's rights in the
space above his land are not unlimited and extend only to the point
of reasonable possibility of use."
See also Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., Inc., 270 Mass. 54,
170 N.E. 385 (1930); 1 JouR. AIR LAW 338, July, 1930, in accord with
this holding.
In Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 17 Ga. 518, 173 S.E. 817 (1934),
it is said:
"A distinction has been made between the air space up to a
height to which the owner may be reasonably expected to occupy it,
and that beyond *"* possibility of man's occupation and dominion,
although as respects the realms beyond, the owner of the land may
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STATE SO VEREIGNTY
The second basic problem is the extent of exclusive control
one sovereign power can exercise over air space as against other
Novereigui powers.
In Hall's "International Law," three views on the sover-
eignty in air space are given: (1) That the air is free to the
,ir,,ulation of all, except that subjacent states are entitled to
make regulations safeguarding their territory; (2) That each
tate po sesses the same rights of sovereignty over the air space
above its territory as it possesses over the land itelf, and by
virtue of this sovereignty states are entitled to take such meas-
ures as they may deem necessary to prevent any visitation by
fo-eign aircraft; (3) That the subjacent state has sovereignty
restricted by a servitude of free passage for foreign aircraft.
The question of jurisdiction over torts and crimes commit-
ted in the air, and contracts made therein, comes within the
hounds of this question of sovereignty of air space.
The tendency of continental jurists has been to apply the
theory of extraterritoriality and provide that the legal relations
between persons in the aircraft are goverfied by the laws of the
s;tate in which the craft is registered, not by the laws of the
state flown over,2'-' that is, an assault committed by an Ohioan
upon a New Yorker, flying over Massachusetts in a Connecticut
plane, would be controlled by the laws of Connecticut.
In the United States, the natural rule is to apply the law
of the subjacent state; -3 a contract made between persons fly-
ing over Illinois would be treated as made in Illinois. A crime
,,omuitted during a flight naturally affects the safety of the
complain of any use tending to diminish the full enjoyment of the
soil beneath."
The case of Johnson v. Curtis Northwest Aeroplane Co., (Minn.
1923) (District Court), was decided on state legislation which for-
bade aerial acrobatics or any flight lower than 2,000 feet over a city
of the first class. Here there had been a forced landing on plaintiff's
land; he sought damages and a permanent injunction restraining air-
craft from passing over his land. The court held that the act im-
pliedly recognizes the rightful existence of air usurpation. There-
fore no injunction was granted; if it was granted it would be a
hindrance to progress.
Sec. 3, Public Act 254, 69th Congress.
Pan-American Aeronautics Federation, March, 1916, WOODHOUSE,
TEXTBOOK ON AERIAL LAw (1920) p. 12.
"This rule is more in accord with the first view.
" Second view.
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state's citizens and their property, and that protection -omes
under the state's police power.24 Under modern conditions the
air space is actually within the control of the subjacent state by
police aircraft and by guns.
The state itself is restricted in its sovereignty by reciprocal
claims and demands upon it by the other sovereign states.*-:
'While "the domain of a state includes the land within its
frontiers, the waters enclosed thereby and the atmosphere
above,''2 such domain is not absolute, but qualified by suli
demands as are made on it by the comity of foreign relations
and domestic necessity.
The Uniform State Aeronautics law which was adopted by
several states and territories declared, in Sec. 2, "That sover-
eignty in the air space above the lands and waters of this state
is declared to rest in the state, except where granted to and as-
sumed by the United States pursuant to a constitutional grant
from the people of this state."
This assertion either implies (1) that the states had sover-
eignty over the air space above their lands and waters prior to
their admission to statehood and retained that sovereignty, ex-
cept as delegated to the Federal government by the Constitu-
tion, or else (2) that the states acquired such sovereignty since
their admission and retained the sovereignty so acquired, ex-
cept as the Constitution provided for the delegation to the Fed-
eral government.
To the former implication the answer seems clear. If the
state had such sovereignty, it was because the air space had been
previously acquired as a part of its domain. This is based on
the second view, which is a transfer to the problem of sover-
eignty of the private property rule of "cujus est solum," which
seems applicable under modern conditions to this phase of the
problem, even though it is outmoded in private property
rights.
Therefore, the second view is the soundest one on which to
base sovereignty of the states with the needed reservations for
'
4 Kuhn, Beginnings of Aerial Law (1910) 4 AM. J. INT. LAW 109,
recommends that the state of the aviator's nationality and the state
over which the crime is committed should have concurrent powers.
(This could give rise to interesting problems on conflicts.)
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 1920) 332 ff.
' Third view.
CIVIL AVIATION-STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION 285
foreign comity and domestic necessity. Our states are sov-
crein powers and sovereignty is a balance between two equals
(two states or two countries). It would be unthinkable if the
state of Michigan should decide that no plane from Indiana
,ould fly over Michigan. However, in our system of Federal
1-overlment, these needed reservations can be provided for, by
the exercise of the supreme Federal power.
That is, in a question of more than local effect, the state
has power only to the extent that the Federal government has
not occupied the field. In such a case, it is not a question of
sovereignty but the power granted to the Federal government
by the Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCE OF FEDERAL POWER
INTRODUCTION
This problem, the Constitutional source of Federal power,
has been raised in the past legislation on civil aviation, but has
never been definitely answered.
The declaration in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, See. 6a,
fails to answer the problem, for it is in respect of the inter-
iational relations of the United States. The Committee report
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the
House of Representatives on the 1926 Act states: "This section
in no wise affects the sovereignty as between the several states
and the United States; but only as between the United States
and the rest of the world."
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 did not answer this
(luestion either. In the pending Lea Bill, Title I, See. 4 "Na-
tional Sovereignty of Air Space," is a proposed new section in
which it is stated: "The United States of America is hereby
dlelared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national
.sovereignty in the air space above the United States, including
the air space above all inland waters and the air space above
these portions of the adjacent marginal high seas, bays and
lakes, over which by international law, treaty, convention, or
otherwise, the United States exercises national jurisdiction."
Debate on the Bill is still going on. Proponents of the Bill
claim that, as set up in other articles in the Bill, it does not
exclude state regulation of civil flying, other than point-to-point
transportation for hire; if the state regulations are consistent
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with the Federal, and if the state regulations do not burden
interstate flying in any way.
Therefore, it seems that state rights prevail over the pri-
vate rights of land owners, and state regulatory legislation is
valid if it can be construed as applying solely to flight within
the state's own domain; that is, as long as it is not in regard to
a matter wh'ich is of national concern.
To decide whether or not such a proposal would be consti-
tutional, it is necessary to go back and study the constitutional
basis of the previous legislative enactments.
There was unanimity that a very important part of any
code regulating aerial navigation should be concerned with pro-
tecting the occupants of the surface; that it should include reg-
istration of the craft, identification and proof of ownership,
inspection of the machines, certificates of airworthiness, com-
pulsory examination, and the examination and licensing of
pilots, the restriction or prohibition of trick flying, and re-
stricted zones, and rules of the air.
All were anxious for uniformity of legislation and wished
to avoid conflicting local codes. For these reasons many
writers advocated exclusive national legislation, but it re-
mained to be seen if it were constitutionally sound.
At least four clauses of the Federal Constitution have been
assigned as authority for this exclusive Federal power: (1) the
Admiralty clause, (2) the war clause, (3) the Treaty-making
clause, (4) the Interstate commerce clause.
1. The Admiralty Clause
The law of aviation is closely allied to and was considered
analogous to admiralty law. In 2 C. J. 299, published in 1915,
is the statement: "In the absence of express statute or interna-
tional regulation by treaty, the principles and analogies of the
common and maritime law must furnish the rule of decision."
Admiralty jurisdiction is essentially connected with the sea
and navigable waters and with navigable things floating
thereon. It does not include all water navigation, for craft
operating on inland waters which have no navigable outlet and
so are useful only in intrastate traffic, are not subject to courts
of admiralty.2 7
"The Daniell Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1870); Stopp v. The Clyde,
43 Minn. 192 (1890).
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In 1922, in a case based on a New York statute of 1913,
which required a marine engine to have a muffler, the court
held tlat a hydroplane was a floating structure within the
meaning' of that Act."' This decision was reversed in 1929.
In a case to libel an aeroplane for repairs, the court held
"aeroplanes are not subjects of admiralty jurisdiction, for they
are neither of the land nor sea, and not being of the sea or re-
stri,.ted in their activities to navigable waters, they are not
niaritime. '-",
Justice Cardozo held that a hydroplane while in the air is
not subject to the laws of admiralty, but while it is in the water
it is so subjected.3" The location and function stamp it as a
means of water transportation even though that is auxiliary
and a secondary function. The Treasury Department requires
seaplanes to be registered, as vessels, in navigating the water;
they are subject to "the rules of the road." 3' Hydroplanes
are also held to be vessels within the meaning of the Tariff
Law.3-
While it is true that there are many similarities between
marine and aerial navigation (the fluidity of mo'vement in the
water and air and the dependency on currents and windshifts,
the necessity of anchorage, docks and airports; the necessity of
guideposts, buoys and light beacons, and the strict licensing of
u perators). it can not be maintained that adniralty jurisdic-
tion includes aerial navigation.
(hnly by maintaining that' admiralty jurisdiction includes
all transportation can it be rationally argued that it covers
aerial navigation, which would place railroads and all land car-
riers under admiralty.
Congress cannot confer on agencies of the Federal govern-
itient powers not granted to them by the Constitution.3 3  Nor
,,an Comgress, by calling aviation law "admiralty," make it
-People ex rel Cushing v. Smith, 196 N.Y.S. 241 (1922).
"'Foss v. The Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (1914).
'Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 18
A.L.R. 1324 (1921).
" Treasury Decision No. 36156.
-'Uniform State Laws of Aeronautics and Opinion of Solicitor
for Department of Commerce, Feb. 7, 1914, See. 1.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
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so.A4 It cannot make admiralty jurisdiction broader than the
judicial power may determine it to be.
2. The War Claise3 5
It was the theory of some members of Congress that the
power of that body to raise and regulate an Army and Navy
gives the Federal Legislature the right to assume exclusive con-
trol over civil aviation. 36
If a'supply of pilots and aircraft for war purposes could
not be obtained except through civilian aviation, and if civilian
aviators would not flourish except under the exclusive Federal
regulation, the proponents of this line of thought would have
had a stronger position. So far, neither of these suppositions
seem correct. Motor transport on land is equally essential to a
successful army, yet the Federal government has not felt that
such control was necessary to the production of a sufficient
quantity of trucks, cars and drivers. There appears to be no
decision of a Federal court pertaining to this theory.
Under the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the President was
authorized to provide by executive order for the setting apart
and the protection of air space reservations in the United
States for national defense or other governmental pulrposesA'
(As was mentioned earlier, today's designated restricted zones
have not been so all-inclusive as during World War I.) This
provision is also in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938; in this
Act, too, is the provision for the setting up and functioning of
the Civilian Pilot Training program. From this, it seems that
only when necessary can civilian aviation be encouraged, c!n-
trolled or curtailed for national defense.3 "
3. The Treaty Cla use 39
It is well-known that the Federal government has exclusive
power to make treaties with foreign governments. And it was
" Steamer St. Lawrence, 1 Black. (U. S. 1861) 572.
Constitution, Art I, Sec. 3.
SSec. 3348 Sen. New Act (1919).
' 33 C. J. 409: "In time of war, the Government may prohibit
all private aircraft."
'Ga. v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907): "The state
has an interest... in all the earth and air within its domain, imply-
ing the power to control it as may be deemed necessary for the public
welfare."
"Constitution, Article II, Sec. 2; Article I, Sec. 10.
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held that where the execution of such a treaty requires Federal
legislation, such legislation will be upheld even though it inter-
fe res with the internal affairs of a state, not otherwise subject
to national control. 40 Some advocates 4' of this theory urged
that if the International Air Navigation Convention was ratified
by the United States, the Federal Legislature would then be
under a duty to enact laws to ensure the carrying out of that
eonvention and could, on that ground, assume control of all
aviation in the United States.
Recently Great Britain has consented to attend a New
Aeronautics Convention to be held in Washington in the near
future, to plan for post-war civil aviation.4 2 It will be import-
ant to follow the developments of this Convention. Under the
treaty power,,, the Federal government may exercise all-
controlling power. That is, if there should develop a treaty
with Russia for commercial flying from 'Moscow to Chicago, the
Federal government would have the right to regulate all flying
within the area of the Chicago airport.
4. T7he (loonn'rce Cla,,se,4 3
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution states: "The
Con.ress shall have power to . . . regulate commerce with for-
eign nations and among the several states and with the Indian
tribes.'
Under the broad construction of this clause, two general
problems remain to be solved: (1) How far does the regulating
power of Congress extend? (2) What commercial regulations
are left to the states?
1. Extent of Federal Power
In Gibbons v. Ogden, 44 the principle was laid don: "Com-
merce is traffic . . . it is intercourse. It means every species of
,-mnmercial intercourse between the United States and foreign
"' Missouri v. Holland, 40 Sup. Ct. 382 (1920).
"' Davis, Laws of the Air (1920) 4 U. S. AIR SERVICE 17; Memo,
JAG Office to Sen. Spencer, December 17, 1920, H.R. 14061, printed
in the Report of Nat. Adv. Committee for Aeronautics; H.R. 14137.
"It was suggested that the London Radio Telegraph Convention
(1912) and the Act of Congress passed to give effect to that Conven-
tion furnish an analogy (U.S. Statute 302).
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8.
"9 Wheat, Wheat 1 (1824).
1.. J.-.
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nations, and has always been understood to comprehend navi-
gation. ',45
2. Federal Power, Ex-tet Over Elemets
The power of Congress to control the elements which arc
used in commerce, that is, waterways, air waves and ether
waves, was one of the problems that had to be solved.
The Constitution does not expressly state that Congress may
regulate the use of airspace-nor of the navigable waters; it is
the power to regulate commerce among the states. In The Daz-
iell Ballo 4 the court said: "Such waters as are used or are sus-
ceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade or travel may be conducted."
Having asserted that, the navigable waters are highways
which are used for commerce, the courts have gone further and
have asserted that Congress has full power to regulate any use
of such waters.
The court held that this power under the Commerce Clause
exists whether or not the particular waterway is actually used
for the flow of interstate traffic if it is susceptible of such use.47
"The power of Congress over commerce is not to be hampered
because of the necessity for reasonable improvements." "The
point is that navigable waters are subject to national planning
and control." 48
The ether waves used in communication by radio are also
subject to the regulatory power. "No state lines divide the
radio waves, and national regulation is not only appropriate but
essential to the efficient use of radio facilities . . . By its very
nature broadcasting transcends state lines and is national in its
scope and importance-characteristics which bring it within the
purpose and protection and subject to the control of the coin-
merce clause. 4 9
4 Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Jolliffe, 2 Wall. 450 (1865).
Power of Commerce extends to all the subjects of commerce and
embrace traffic navigation and intercourse.
"10 Wall. 557 (1870).
U. S. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S. Ct.
291 (1940).
"sOklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508, 61 S. Ct. 1050 (1941): "It
is within the power of Congress to construct dams even upon streams
if the condition of such stream affected the navigability of another's
stream."
" Fed. Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co.,
289 U.S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933).
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In 1925 and again in 1926, the I-louse Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce said: "The declaration of what
".,,nstitutes navigable air space is an exercise of the same source
oif power, the interstate commerce clause, as that under which
(onress has long declared in many acts, what constitutes navi-
,able or non-navigable waters."
From the holdings cited above, it is now apparent that Con-
press has the power to regulate the use of air space-simply
because the air space is used or is susceptible of use as a medium
of vonmnerce anong the states.
EXTENT oI POWER OVER INSTRUMENTALITIES.
As one of the major interests of the Federal government
is to promote interstate commerce, it has power to regulate the
instrumentalities of commerce. The extent of that power has
been the subject of much litigation concerning rates, both inter-
state al intrastate, safety problems, and economic stability.
(a) Rtihs.
It is well established that the rates for interstate transpor-
tation may be fixed by Congress or by a Commission upon which
('ongress has conferred the power to do so. °
('onress can also regulate intrastate rates in some cases,
is was said in the Shreveport Rate Case :" 'Congress has com-
plete and paramount power to regulate commerce among the
several states. Where this power exists, it dominates . . . Its
authority extending to these interstate carriers as instruments
of interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the right to control
their operations in all matters having such a close and substan-
tial relation to interstate traffic, that control is essential to the
security and maintenance of that traffic . . . 'Wherever the inter-
state and intrastate transactions are so related that the govern-
nent of one involves the control of the other, it is Congress and
not the state that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant
rule.'
" St. Louis Northwestern Ry. Co. v. U. S., 245 U.S. 136, 32 S. Ct.
49 (1917); ROTTSCHAEFFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) p. 251.
"' Houston East and West Line Ry. Co. v. U. S., 245 U.S. 342
(1914).
See also: Railroad Commission v. Chicago B. & 0. Ry. Co., 257
U.S. 573, 42 S. Ct. 232 (1922).
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From this basis it is reasonable to see that tlhe Federal gov-
ernment has the power to regulate interstate air traffic rates
and also those of the feeder lines where necessary to protet
interstate air commerce.
(b) Safety Devices.
A recognition that Congress can step into the field of intra-
state commerce when it is necessary in order to protect ade-
quately or to pi'oinote interstate traffic is also found in the cases
relating to the Safety Appliance Act. Under that Act the court
held that it was constitutional to prescribe the safety appliances
on railroad cars moving solely in intrastate traffic, since inter-
state cars would move over the same railroad.53
Nor is it necessary under the Constitution that Congress
confine its regulations to particular activities which are showni
actually to endanger commerce among the states. Congress may
so control intrastate activities as to assure the elimination of
potential damages.54
Since it has been held constitutional for the Federal gov-
ernment to regulate on safety questions regarding railroad
transportation, it is even more obvious why centrally controlled
safety measures are necessary in the case of air commerce, than
in the case of rail traffic. The speed and distance factors of air
traffic bring the inter- and intrastate flights into one com-
ponent whole in their interdependency for safe travel. The
power of Congress in the field of safety regulation is undoubt-
edly complete.-)
(c) Economic Stability.
It is, of course, quite true that the finest safety regulations
will not assure safety if the operators are in an unsound
economic condition.
In promoting safe and continuous operations in commerce
among the states, it is quite appropriate that Congress take
action assuring that interstate operation will have a sound
financial basis. This was shown in the Dayton, Goose (reek Ry.
Co. v. U. S.,5 which upheld the power of Congress to authorize
Southern Ry. Co. v. U. S., 22 U.S. 20 (1911).
'People v. Katz, 249 N.Y.S. 719 (1931).
'Rosenhan v. U. S., 131 F. (2d) 932 (C.C.A. Utah, 1942).
263 U.S. 456, 44 S. Ct. 169 (1924).
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the Interstate Commerce Commission to control, as provided in
the reapture clause of the Transportation Act, 1920, the earn-
ings of the railroad above a fair return on the value of the
property : ". . . the Act seeks affirmatively to build up a system
of railroads prepared to handle promptly all the interstate
traffic of the country. It aims to give the owners of the railroads
an opportunity to earn enough to maintain their properties and
equipment in such a state of efficiency that they can carry well
this burden."
The power of the Federal government to regulate intrastate
colifuerce is not restricted to prescribing rates thereforr 7 It
may, in order to relieve interstate commerce from undue and
unjust burdens, authorize the complete abandonment by an
interstate railroad of unprofitable branch lines although this
necessarily involves their abandonment of intrastate services.
A state has no constitutional authority to compel such carrier
to continue intrastate commerce on such branch lines, if the
Feleral government has authorized their abandomuent. s
The necessity of economic stability in transportation sys-
tems was applied and reemphasized by the Senate Committee
,n ('onuerce (1935) when it reported: "It should be unneces-
sary to point out that a profitable operation is essential to safety.
It is bad enough for ordinary corporations to be harassed by
losses, but in the case of the air vehicle when safety depends
on expensive equipment there must be ample funds or the ships
must be grounded. There must be profits, if adequate and timely
improvements are to be provided. Because a few persons make
abnormal profits from speculative activities should not obscure
the truth that safety and efficiency demand reasonable profit in
operation."
In view of this great need in air transport for economic
stability, to provide continuous and safe service, it is apparent
that Congress can enact broad measures of financial control over
airlines.
Lot 'AL ACTIVITIES AFFECTING INTERSTATE-COWMMERCE.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court reflect the trend of
ever-widening control under the Commerce Clause.
CIROTTSCHAEFFER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (1939) pp. 254, 255.
"State of Colorado v. U. S., 271 U.S. 153, 46 S. Ct. 452 (1926).
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In N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.,:'" it was
said: "Although activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and ob-
structions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that
control. "
Again, in Kirschbauim v. 1alling,'o' service employees of
a building, portions of which were leased to businesses engaged
in interstate commerce, were held to be "engaged in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce," and therefore subject to the pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.61
SUMMARY OF EXTENT OF FEDERAL POWER.
From the foregoing it is seen that under the Commerce
Clause, the Federal power may control the channels of com-
merce; the instrumentality used by control of its rates, safety
regulations and economic stability; and even non-commercial or
local activities which affect commerce. In the aviation field.
this includes control of the air space, the planes used, the rates
that may be charged on interstate flights and on intrastate feeder
lines, the safety precautions used, and safety improvements that
may be forthcoming, the economic soundness of the airlines, and
under the rulings of the Jones and Laughlin case and Kirsch-
baun v. Walling, the control might well extend to the employees
of the building housing the cars which take the passengers to
and from the airport.
EXTENT OF STATE POWERS.
It is clear that a Federal Act is superior to a state law on
the same subject, and where repugnancy exists, that authority
which is supreme must control. To determine the rights of the
state, it must first be understood that there are two types of
situations in which the question may arise: (1) Regulation of
a matter that is national in scope, and (2) Regulation of a
matter that is local in scope.
'301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
'62 S. Ct. 1116 (1942); Note (1942) 41 MicH. L. R. 340.
'See also U. S. v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
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(a) Nalimal in Scope.
In this first situation, whether Congress has enacted legisla-
tion or not, the states cannot touch the problem. The general
rule is stated, regulation of a subject-matter which the National
(lovernment might regulate under one of its concurrent powers
is exc-luded from a state's reserved powers whenever the National
(4ivernment has indicated its intention to exclude it therefrom.
This may be done either by affirmative action, or by non-
a,.tion. If it is national in scope and requiring uniform legisla-
tion, then non-action shows an intent to exclude state regulation.
(',oly v. Board of Past Wardens62 was the first definite
formulation of this theory. "When the subject-matter is national
in st.ope, that is, when uniform legislation is necessary in order
to promote and maintain interstate commerce, Congress alone
may enact the needed legislation" referring to the regulation of
navigation and navigators.
In Wabash, St. Louis and P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois,2 a case in-
volving the question of freight rates, the court said: "If each
state was at liberty to regulate the conduct of carriers while
within its jurisdiction, the confusion likely to follow could not
but be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary
hardship."
The question, to sum up, is whether the state action would
,*onflict with the exclusive power of the National GovernmentA4
In air commerce, such problems, of national scope, would
include air-worthiness certification of the planes, certification
oif the operators, rules of the road, (air) rates, and beacon
sigiials.
(b) Local in Scope.
In this second type of situation, the state may regulate
matters that concern only the state. "The states may regulate
in those fields where national uniformity is not essential.''5
A state may promote public convenience and safety, by
-12 How. 299 (1851)
- 118 U.S. 557, 7 S. Ct. 4 (1886).
"Leisy v. Harden, 135 U.S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681 (1890); Bowman
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 8 S. Ct. 689 (1888); Chirac
v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 (1817)-a uniform rule of naturalization;
ROTTSCHAEFFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) pp. 90, 91.
' Cloverleaf v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
prescribing reasonable routes and fixing terminals for interstate
buses operating over the public streets of a city.06
A state may by reasonable quarantine regulations prevent
the introduction into it from other states or foreign countries
of goods and persons,6 7 or the transportation through it, so far
as reasonably necessary for the protection of its health, safety
or welfare.is'  The theory on which state quarantines are sus-
tained is not that they do not directly regulate and burden
interstate commerce, but that the burden is one that interstate
commerce may reasonably be made to bear in order to protect
important state interests.0 9 It is local in scope, and Congress
by its silence has shownu an intent that the states may regulate.
(c) Occupation of the Field.
1h7en matters are local in scope, the states can regulate
until the Federal government "occupies the field." 7 " When the
field is occupied, this shows an intent that the state regulation
shall be excluded.
In Oregon-Washington R. & 1. Co. v. Washinb,.onj1 it is
said: "the rule is that there is a field in which the local in-
terests of states touch so closely upon interstate cemmere
that, in the silence of Congress on the subject, the states may
exercise their police powers. But when Congress has acted and
occupied the field, the power of the states to act is prevented."
An important problem comes up when the Federal govern-
ment has not occupied the field wholly. This is shown clearly in
cases arising from highway safety and conservation measures.
A state has broad powers to regulate the actual operation
of motor vehicles using its highways for interstate transporta-
tion. In South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barn well
Bros.,7 2 the state had passed a statute restricting the use of
'Phillips v. Moulton, 54 F. (2d) 119 (D.C., 1931)-duty to per-
mit adequate terminal for interstate ferry; IVlayer, etc. of Vandalia v.
McNeely, 274 U.S. 676, 47 S. Ct. 758 (1927).
9 ROTTSCHAEFFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) p. 290.
'
8Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. Rly. Co., 181 U.S. 208, 21 S. Ct. 53
(1900); Hannibal R. Co. & St. Joseph Ry. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465,
24 L. Ed. 527 (1877); Chylung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
ROTTSCHAEFFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) pp. 292-3.
Clark Distillery Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311,
37 S. Ct. 80 (1917).
"270 U.S. 87, 46 S. Ct. 279 (1926)
-303 U.S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510 (1938).
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highways by trucks above a specified width. This necessarily
applied to trucks engaged in interstate as well as intrastate
traffi.. The court held: "The present case affords no occasion
for saying that the bare possession of power by Congress to
regulate the interstate traffic forces the states to conform to
standards whit.h Congress might, but has not adopted, or curtails
their power to take measures to insure the safety and conserva-
tion ,f their highways which may be applied to like traffic
moving intrastate . . . But so long as the state action does not
discriminate, the burden is one which the Constitution permits
because it is an inseparable incident of the exercise of a legis-
lative authority, which, under the Constitution, has been left to
the states."
Recently, in 1942, in Clo,crheaf v. Patterson,73 an Alabama
statute gave state officials power to seize packing stock butter
(prior to its processing), which did not come up to the stand-
ard. Petitioner brought suit to restrain the state officials from
seizing his butter on the ground that the law was invalid as
being repugnant to Federal lavs, by which the field had been
v-,u pied.
In the majority opinion by Justice Reed, holding the law
rpugnant, is stated the formula that " . . . where this power
to legislate exists, it often happens that there is only a partial
exercise of that power by the Federal government ... But where
the United States exercises its power of legislation so as to
conflict with a regulation of the state, whether specifically or
by implication, the state legislation becomes inoperative and
the Federal legislation is exclusive in its application."
Until the most recent cases, the courts have tried to uphold
the states' rights34 The court construed the scope of the Federal
enactment strictly to save the state law.
AIR TRAFFIC RULES.
Up to the passage of the Air Commerce Act in 1926, seven-
teen states had enacted regulatory acts providing, in general,
for registration of aircraft, certification of airworthiness, cer-
tification of pilots and the prescription of air traffic rules.
S313 U.S. 148, 62 S. Ct. 491 (1942).
"Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937); N. W. Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. Nebraska State Ry. Commission, 297 U.S. 471, 480(1936); Smith v. Ill. Bell Telephone Co., 282 U.S. 133, 160 (1930).
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The Federal government, under the Act of 1926, granted
power to the Secretary of Commerce to prescribe the air traffic
rules applicable to all air navigation, whether the craft is
engaged in intrastate, interstate, or non-commercial flights.7 5
An aircraft must necessarily engage in navigation that is not
wholly within the domain of the state. It must navig'ate, in
part, in the upper strata of air space, which is without the
domain of the state, and therefore not intrastate flight.7 6
"It is apparent that all or nearly all of the many air traffi,
rules must be applied to both interstate and intrastate craft in
order to secure the safety ... the Federal regulations must be
paramount.' '77
In People v. Katz, 7 8 the court held that Article I, Sec. 8 of
the Constitution empowered Congress to regulate commerce
among the several states and that the air traffic rules (here the
altitude restrictions) were constitutional.79
While the provisions of the Act of 1926 do not expressly
apply to aircraft and pilots engaged in non-commercial naviga-
tion, the necessity for nationwide uniformity in air traffic rules
seems too obvious to be argued in these days of tremendous speed
and power in planes and in the great increase in air traffic.
The only provision of the bill applying expressly to intra-
state commerce is that in regards to safety inspections, and this
is identical with the application of the vessel registration and
inspection laws which have, since 1789 and 1838, applied to all
craft upon navigable waters, interstate or intrastate, or on
pleasure operations only.
The purpose of the- safety regulations, as stated in the
declaration of the Acts, states that: "No aircraft shall operate
in a designated civil airway without having currently in effect,
an airworthiness certificate, evincing Congressional judgment
that such an operation is detrimental to safety and such an
operation is a violation. "SO
See also Law Memoranda upon Civil Aeronautics, Public Act
254, 69th Congress, Air Commerce Act, Sec. 2c (1926).
"Lord v. Goodall Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541, 544 (1880).
,7 Information Bulletin 7, Department of Commerce.
- 249 N.Y.S. 719 (1931).
In 2 JOURNAL AiR LAW, p. 602 (1931) it was stated in the report
of a case: "The air commerce act is assumed to be constitutional
rather than decided."
I Sec. 55-2-3 CAA (1938).
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In the Ro .elaba case,xI the court held it to be a violation
notwithstanding that at the time of such operation no other
-irraft was within dangerous range and there was no actual
danger to interstate commerce."
The Act of 1926 was amended and in Sec. 402 of the Act of
1938 it is stated: "it is to assure the highest degree of safety"
in air travel.,-' Sec. 401 reads: "Any citizen of the United
8tate who undertakes . . . to engage in air transportation . . .
which directly affects or which may endanger safety in inter-
state, overseas or foreign air commerce. '"
Between 1938 and 1942, traffic, even on our present civil
airways, increased 8007. It has been estimated that by 1950
it will amount to 60,000,000 movements a year.s 4 The airways of
today will decrease in relative importance due to civilian use of
radar, direction finders and new flying techniques. Traffic will
be moving at various elevations, and speeds are almost unpre-
dictable. W\ith these developments coming apace, there surely
,an be no sound arguments against having these safety precau-
tions uniform in development and in enforcement. The Lea Bill
lefines clearly the status of commercial planes and private fly-
ing. Both would remain under strict control as to safety meas-
ures, as they certainly should.-
A iR'IRTS-REGULATION, DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION.
The Lea Bill, like the present law, leaves the regulation of
airports to local and state authorities.", The Bill does provide
that where Federal funds are expended on an airport, the Ad-
ministrator has power to require that the contracts and agree-
ments be made giving assurance that the public use, operation
and protection of the airport will be provided by the local own-
ers, usually the nunicipalities."7 Under the present law, there
is no definite requirement for proper airport planning to assure
against waste of funds.
"'Rosenhan v. U. S., (CCA, 1942, Utah) 131 Fed. 932 (1942).
SNeiswonger v. Goodyear Tire, 35 F. (2d) 761 (1929); Sheboy-
gan AirWays v. Ind. Comm., 209 Wis. 352 (1932).
" Civil Air Board of CCA v. Canadian Colonial Airways, 41
F. Supp. 1006 (1941).
"Hearings on H. R. 1012 and 3042 Lea Bill.
'Hearings on H. R. 1012 and 3042 Lea Bill.
Public Act 254-69th Congress.
Only one civil commercial airport is owned by the Federal
government-Washington National Airport.
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Federal legislation has recognized that landings and taking
off are functions more properly regulated by local authority,
under ordinary conditions.8 8 M\unicipalities may enact ordi-
nances pertaining to the lives, health and property of their
residents, as long as those laws do not unduly burden interstate
commerce or air mail service.
In the Civil Aeronautics Act, the Administrator, in Se,.
452, is empowered to acquire, in whole or in part, air navigation
facilities at and upon any municipality owned or other landing
area that is approved (by him) and to direct and make plans
for development of such areas as will best meet the needs and
safety of civil aeronautics.
It is interesting to see how in the early days of civil aviation
(not so long ago) it was necessary for the courts to decide
whether or not an airport served a public purpose. In Hssc v.
Roth,5" there was a state statute authorizing cities of New
York to establish and operate airports; the local legislative
body may regulate the use and establish fees and charges.
Cardozo, J., in the decision, held that such a statute was con-
stitutional, that the airport would serve both a public and
municipal purpose, and therefore the city was allowed to incur
indebtedness for this purpose.
Anderton v. Watkins says:90 "Obviously a plane cannot be
allowed to use the public streets as a parking place." (Perhaps
in the near future they may.)
The Supreme Court of Kansas held: 9  "The airway is
essentially a free highway. It is a material and permanent way,
through the air, laid out with the precision and care of an
engineer . . . As such it is open to all qualified aircraft. It is
rightly therefore a Federal undertaking to lay out and equip
airways. The maintenance of airports, however, comes legiti-
mately within the scope of the municipality in much the same
manner as docks and harbors for marine shipping."
'Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923
(1884); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 24 L. Ed. 1115 (1878).
-249 N.Y. 486, 164 N.E. 342 (1928).
122 Me. 246, 120 Atl. 175 (1923).
City of Wichita v. Clapp, 123 Kan. 100, 263 Pac. 12 (1928).
Accord: St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 543 (1918); Halbruegger v.
City of St. Louis, 302 Mo. 573 (1924).
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Many courts have had occasion to hold that the acquisition
and vontrol of municipal airports is a public purpose within the
provision of the constitutional purpose.92
Airports may not be established when they will prevent the
use of neighboring property.93 A municipality may use the
right of eminent domain to acquire land for airports only if that
power has been conferred by a state statute, specifying that the
taking is for a public use; the land may be outside its corporate
limits.,4
(0'oNLUsION.
From the survey, it will be readily seen that in the short
space of forty years aviation has grown from one fragile
machine to an industry that has tremendously affected our lives,
thoughts, topography and laws.
It has been shown that, because of the development of
aerial navigation, it has been necessary to determine that (1)
man no longer owns his land and surrounding air space to the
sky, but only to the limits of effective possession ; that (2) the
states have sovereignty over their domains liiited by the neces-
sities of foreign comity and domestic needs; that (3) the
Federal government, under' the right of the Commerce Clause,
,an regulate the channels, instruments, protection and effects
of air commerce; that (4) under the treaty clause that power
may become even greater; that (5) the states under recent
decisions may regulate air travel only to the extent in which
the Federal government has not occupied the field.
It has also been shown that, by necessity, Federal air
traffic rules must protect all aviation, but that airports may
be regulated, to some extent as yet, by the municipalities in
which they are -located.
By tracing the development of these decisions along with
the concurrent development of civil aviation, it becomes readily
understandable that flying is no longer a private sport, but a
Major means of transportation which must necessarily be uni-
formly regulated and controlled.
'"State ex rel City of Lincoln v. Johnson, 220 N.W. 273 (1928);
State ex rel Hile v. City of Cleveland, 160 N.W. 241 (C.C.A. Ohio,
1927); Read v. New York City Airport, 259 N.Y. 245 (1932).
Swetland case, supra, note 21.
°" Bremerton v. North Pacific Public Service Co., 243 F. 980
(1917); Western Union v. Pa. Ry. Co., 120 Fed. 362 (1903).
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